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NoTEs
JURISDICTION OF ZONING BOARDS
I
INTRODUCTION

With the rapidly increasing urbanization of American life has come

a realization that thoughtful, intelligent, and creative planning is necessary to the creation of communities adequate for the needs of modem
living. The effective control of land use and building construction and
location is essential to the realization of community planning and the
ultimate goals of the community. These goals are accomplished
through a plan of comprehensive community zoning. The planning
and zoning of a city is usually conducted through a planning and zoning board which puts its ideas and plans into effect through the enactment of ordinances by the city council. It is the purpose of this note
to discuss, in general, the jurisdiction of zoning boards and the problems involved in carrying out the planning and zoning program.
What is zoning? In general, zoning is the division of a designated
area into districts for the purpose of regulating the present and future
use, construction, and location of buildings and the use of land.' Zoning does not include those building construction regulations which seek
to minimize the risk of health and fire hazards, or other related controls
which are encompassed by building codes.2 There has been a tendency
in the past to confuse such regulations with zoning laws.
The purpose of zoning is to influence development toward the
accomplishment of an over-all community plan which will preserve
existing neighborhood values and encourage new development of high
quality. This purpose is served generally by grouping together uses
that belong with each other and by protecting residential, business,
and industrial areas against the encroachment of inappropriate uses or
buildings. Without zoning restrictions, commercial enterprises such as
factories, laundries and slaughter houses may directly adjoin singlefamily houses; open spaces surrounding houses may be inadequate;
and "the tempo of building obsolescence and neighborhood blight" 3 is
often speeded.
The power of the municipality to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance is based upon and limited by the police power delegated to it
by the state. Inasmuch as this power is legislative, only the legislative
body of the municipality may establish the boundaries of the zone dis' 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 2 (1056).
1
Sign
TAmerican
Corporation v. Fowler, 276 SW 2d 651 (Ky. 1955).
3 Supra, note 1 at 2.
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tricts.4 Since the Supreme Court of the United States first upheld a
zoning ordinance, 5 the use of zoning legislation to achieve the desired
goals of community planning and development has spread to the point
where all states now have statutes which authorize municipalities to
adopt and enforce zoning regulations.0 Also, county zoning is expressly
authorized by legislation in thirty-one states.7 Because of the disparity
in the legislation of the various states authorizing zoning, and because
of different interpretation placed on them by the judiciary, no attempt
will be made in this note to digest individual state zoning laws. Instead focus will be on the several problems of jurisdiction which are
common to all municipalities in their efforts to zone, with emphasis on
extraterritorial zoning by municipalities in Kentucky. A comparative
digest of state enabling statutes has been published as indicated in
footnote 6.
II
JUEISDICUONAL PROBLEMS

There are three major types of jurisdictional problems which have
arisen with regard to zoning. (1) When two cities have a common
boundary but each has a different policy as to the development of land
situated on its side of the line; (2) Where two or more cities expand
their jurisdictional controls either through annexation or through the
use of their extraterritorial powers so that each seeks to exercise control over the same land; and, (8) Conflicts between city and rural areas
surrounding the city where the urbanization and zoning of farm land
is opposed. The second and third problems encompass the fundamental problems of extraterritorial zoning.
The first problem arises when owners of land in one municipality
attempt to use their property in such a way that it affects the rights of
an owner of property in another municipality. The property involved
may be split only by an imaginary line which separates the two municipalities. Inasmuch as each city has sole power to zone the area within
its corporate limits, the question arises as to whether a municipality
must take into consideration the use of property across the line but in
another municipality. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the New Jersey Court which said that zoning is for the benefit
of the public health, morals, and welfare, and includes any person who
4 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations pp. 131-32 (1950); Bray v. Beyer,
292 Ky. 162, 166 SW 2d 290 (1942).

5 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6 Comparative Digest of Municipal and County Zoning Enabling Statutes,
Housing and Home Finance Agency 2 (1952).
7 Ibid.
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is benefited or affected by the restriction.8 This Court went further
and said that the public health, morals, and welfare are not limited by
the boundaries of any particular zoning district, nor even by the
boundaries of the municipality adopting the ordinance. If property
outside the municipality is affected by the zoning, the use of such
property must be taken into consideration. It is almost inevitable that
an adjoining municipality will be affected in some degree by the zoning regulations of its bordering neighbor, and it would be unjust and
unreasonable for one municipality to zone an area for residential purposes and for another to zone an adjacent area for industrial or business purposes. Hence, it becomes a legal requirement that the zoning
regulations of one municipality must be made with consideration and
conformance to the character and use of the land lying along its border
but under the jurisdiction and control of another municipality. The
ordinance must take into consideration the physical, economic, and
social conditions prevailing within the adjoining municipality, and the
nature of the entire region for which it may be used in the future.9
The fact that much of the contiguous use is in an adjoining municipality
is no reason for disregarding land use in that municipality. It is a
question of existing conditions and not of geographical and territorial
limits or of the powers of the neighboring municipality.'0
The second and third problems of extraterritorial zoning are
brought about by the power of municipalities to zone extraterritorially
and can be discussed together. As previously noted, municipalities
cannot exceed their statutory authorization in zoning. Therefore, unless express authority is given, the municipality cannot zone beyond
its corporate limits. Some states expressly authorize their municipalities to zone extraterritorially while others do not. However, the increasing development of areas on the fringe of cities has intensified the
interest in the grant to cities of power to zone extraterritorially.
Municipalities need this power in order to protect themselves against
undesirable property use and to prevent inconsistent land use prior
to the time the land is incorporated into the city by annexation. City
planners also desire to protect adjacent areas of scenic beauty from
the hazards of billboards, improvidently planted crops, and structures
improperly constructed or located. Adequate land-use regulation is
now recognized as a necessity in planning for the economic development of any municipality and the surrounding area.
8 Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A 2d
182 (1953).
'1See Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A 2d
347, 9 ALR 2d 678 (1949).
lu Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 11. 166, 180 NE 767 (1932).
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Several states have recognized the need for granting municipalities
the power to zone extraterritorially and have made such provisions by
statute. However, where such zoning is involved, the problem has
arisen as to the extent a city should be permitted to zone beyond its
corporate limits. The constitutionality of such zoning is also in issue
where the county residents have no say in how their property is zoned.
Some states have tried to solve this problem by putting a mileage
limit on the extraterritorial powers of the city." This, however, has the
disadvantage of setting an arbitrary limit to the area in which zoning
powers may be exercised. Suppose, for example, that an area within
three miles of the city may be zoned. Later the city incorporates that
area. Inasmuch as no provisions were made for zoning beyond that
area, inconsistant land use may now exist at the very edge of the
corporate limits. Such arbitrary limit may, in fact, prevent the city
from expanding. Or suppose an industry desires to locate close to
the municipality. This would have a decided effect on the future
planning and welfare of the city and would create many new problems
for the city and county. Therefore, it is believed that an arbitrary limit
is not the answer to the problem.
Kentucky, recognizing the need for extraterritorial zoning by municipalities, has attempted to solve this problem in a different manner.
It has, by statute, divided its cities into three categories for zoning
purposes.' 2 First class cities are grouped together, second class cities
are grouped together, and third, fourth, fifth, and sixth class cities
comprise the third group.
With regard to any first class city and the county containing such
city, the legislature has provided for an agreement between them to
regulate the planning and zoning of the entire county.Yz Such agreement, after approval by the legislative body of the city and the fiscal
court of the county, is put into effect by the adoption of a mutual
ordinance passed by both bodies which governs the use of land in the
entire county. Provisions are made for equal representation on the
planning and zoning board so that county citizens cannot claim that
they are being deprived of the use of their land without representation
on the board. A provision is also made to the effect that any other incorporated municipality located in such county may avail itself of the
benefits of the city-county agreement at any time with the consent
of said city and county. 14 Thereafter, such municipality is subject to
Neb. Rev. Stat., Suppl. see. 14-419 (1943).
Rev. Stat., Cha pter 100 (1953) (Hereinafter referred to as "KRS").
13 KRS, sec. 100.031 p1953).
14 KRS, sec. 100.033 (1953).
31

12 Ky.
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the city-county zoning. Louisville is the only designated first class city
in Kentucky, and the provisions of this statute, therefore, affect only
Louisville and Jefferson County. Other less suitable provisions are
made for the remaining cities, which as they now stand, do not solve
the problems involved in extraterritorial zoning.
With regard to second class cities, the legislature has provided that
each city shall have the power to zone within its corporate limits and
its "municipal area." 15 Municipal area is defined as the surrounding
territory which bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city.16
However, the further provision is made that before the city can zone
outside its corporate limits it must submit the report of the zoning
commission to the fiscal court of the county in which that city is
located. 17 If the commission's report is disapproved by the fiscal court,
it is ineffective for any purpose outside the city limits, unless the city
has jurisdiction beyond its corporate limits by virtue of its charter.' 8
The fiscal court cannot alter or amend the report but must accept or
reject it in toto.19 Thus, a county containing a second class city can
prohibit any city within that county from exercising zoning power
beyond its corporate limits. This could be detrimental to the best
interest and welfare of the city, especially if the county refuses to cooperate in regulating the use of land in the county but outside the
corporate limits of the city. Further, no statutory provisions are made
for the county to zone itself.2 0 Therefore, in the absence of such an
agreement between the second class city and the county in which it
is situated, land within that county can be used for any purpose as long
as it does not create a nuisance. Thus, inconsistent and undesirable
land use may exist up to the very corporate limits of the municipality.
III
CotYrrv ZONING-WHAT BEARnS A PBMATION TO THE PLANNING
AND ZONING OF THE CITY

Even if there is an agreement between the city and county, the
problem is not solved, for the zoning power may be exercised outside
the city only over the area which bears a relation to the planning and
zoning of the city. What bears a relation to the planning and zoning
of a city? What tests should be applied in determining this? Who
15 KRS, see. 100.320 (1953).
16 KRS, see. 100.010(6) (1953).
17 KRS, see. 100.410(1) (1953).
18 KRS, sec. 100.410(2) (1953).
19 KRS, sec. 100.410(1) (1953).
20 Supra, note 12.
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should determine that the necessary relationship exists? These are
questions which are not easy to answer. An attempt was made to
solve these problems in the recent case of American Sign Corporation
v. Fowler.21 In that case the Court ruled that the city of Lexington,
Kentucky, a city of the second class, acting in conjunction with the
county, did not have power to prohibit a drive-in theatre located some
six miles from the city limits. In accordance with statutory authority
previously discussed, the city and county had zoned the entire county
of Fayette. However, the Court held that the area sought to be zoned
did not bear a substantial relation to the planning and zoning of the
city. The Court said that "the phrase 'bears relation to the planning
and zoning of the city' means just what it says-that the territory must
bear relation to the planning and zoning of the city; in other words, the
territory must be so situated as to have a bearing on the planning and
zoning scheme for the city."22 This language is pure Gertrude Stein
("a rose is a rose is a rose"). It does not answer the question of what
facts must be shown before a city and county can zone on the ground
that such area "bears a substantial relation to the planning and zoning
of the city." The Court went on, however, to approve the circuit court's
"declarationon the question of 'municipal area'."23 Whether this means
the Court approved the circuit court's "declaration" of fact or of law
is not clear but presumably it means the latter. The test adopted by
the circuit court, relying on the case of Smeltzer v. Messer,24 was that
the area over which the city and county can zone outside the city's
corporate limits is limited to that area which in the foreseeable future
might be annexed to the city.
There are a number of objections to reading such a test into the
statute. If the legislature had intended to restrict the powers of second
class cities to such an extent, it could have done so by express language.
And the same arguments can be made against this as were previously
made against setting an arbitrary mileage limit. The primary objection,
however, is that ambiguous statutory language should be given a meaning which will enable the planning and zoning commission to execute
properly the powers granted it by the legislature; the meaning apparently approved by the court seriously restricts the ability of the
planning and zoning commission to accomplish objectives spelled out
in the Enabling Act.
The Kentucky Court misconceived the purpose of zoning and the
objectives of the Enabling Act when it stated, disapprovingly, that the
21276
SW 2d.651 (Ky. 1955).
22
24

Supra, note 2 at 655.

23 Ibid.

Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 SW 2d 96 (1949).
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county-wide zoning involved had been "approached, not from the
standpoint of relation to the planning and zoning of the city, but from
the standpoint of the economic, commercial and social interests of the
city."25 The promotion of these interests is the very purpose of zoning.
The objective of the entire planning and zoning system is to increase,
among other things, the community's economic, commercial and social
welfare. Unless the zoning ordinance as applied promotes the welfare
of the community, it will be stricken down as being an unlawful exercise of the police power. It is hard to see how the Court could adopt
the position that the economic, social and commercial interests of the
city have no bearing on the question of validity of the county zoning
scheme. The planning and zoning scheme would be an unlawful
exercise of the police power if it did not have those very interests in
mind. The Court should have looked to see if the ordinance as applied
was in furtherance of the planning objectives of the city. If it was,
then it bears a relation to the objectives of the city plan. The city and
county should be permitted to have a flexible zoning plan which has
as its objective increasing a wide variety of values, and when land use
in the county substantially affects the preservation and increase of
these values, the city and county should have jurisdiction over the
land. Such land use quite obviously "bears relation to the planning
and zoning of the city."
The vice of the American Sign Corporation case is not the result,
but the reasoning. The result is justifiable-perhaps compelled-because the zoning ordinance did not make available for drive-in theatres
any land in Fayette County. The ordinance established an "Amusement-2" zone which covered the operation of drive-in theatres, but
it did not designate any territory in this classification. Under the
ordinance the Planning Commission had to wait until a person applied
for this classification before allotting it to any specific land. And even
then the Commission did not have the final word on the application.
If the land lay in the county the Commission could only recommend
to the County Fiscal Court-which might accept or reject. No standards were set up for passing on the application.
To prevent a legitimate business enterprise which is not a nuisance
from locating anywhere in the county is a clear abuse of the zoning
power.'- And if an activity is kept out not by blanket prohibition but
by the device used here--i.e., allowing it only with the consent of the
2
6 Supra, note 9.
25 Supra, note 2, at 655.
Zoning is only one method used to keep drive-ins out. For another, see

27

Note, "Scope of Discretion of County Court in licensing Drive-In Theaters," 43
Ky. L.J. 417 (1955). To date only two drive-in theaters have been allowed in
Fayette County (population in 1950: 100,746).
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Commission and the Fiscal Court, which consent may be arbitrarily
given or refused-the abuse is equally clear. If the activity is to be
allowed only with permission of the zoning authorities (which may be
proper where the activity generates extra heavy traffic, is unsafe or
unusually unsightly, or is a "psychological nuisance" to the neighbors),
the authorities should be required to set up standards specifying under
what conditions the activity will be permitted. Otherwise a grave problem of equal protection arises. Because no such standards were set up
here, the refusal to reclassify was arbitrary and thus an unconstitutional
restriction of the applicant's right to use her property as she saw fit.
Here were the proper grounds for the result.
The American Sign Corporation case has had an interesting aftermath. Because of the unrealistic and restrictive ruling of the Court in
that case, which left uncertain the Planning and Zoning Commission's
jurisdiction outside the city limits, the Commission was faced with the
problem of determining what area in the county might in the foreseeable future be annexed to the city. The Commission, for want of
prophetic vision, drew an arbitrary line three miles from the present
city limits (which line is about 112 miles beyond the built-up suburban
area). This gave the Commission control of very little land that might
be used as factory sites outside the city, however, and the president of
the Lexington Industrial Foundation-an organization interested in

bringing new industry to Fayette County-requested the County Judge
to take immediate action to determine "municipal area" so that orderly
planning for industrial development might proceed. In accordance
with this request, the County Judge requested the Commission to take
the necessary steps to determine "realistically the proper geographical
limits for planning and zoning in this county." The Commission then

appointed James Pickford as a consultant to make a study of what
comprised Fayette County's "municipal area."

After a survey of Fayette County, Pickford submitted his report to
the Planning and Zoning Commission. He based his determination of
Fayette County's "municipal area" on the existence of four factors:
(1) existing commercial, residential and industrial land use; (2) availability of public water and gas facilities; (3) traffic generators and
(4) potential industrial sites. Where these factors are present, the land
is primarily "urban oriented," Pickford concluded, and may in the
foreseeable future be annexed by the city. Pickford's report was approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission and submitted to the
County Fiscal Court for approval. The Fiscal Court refused to approve the report because the "municipal area" it proposed did not
cover enough territory in the county. The Fiscal Court took the posi-
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tion that the horse farms-a major "industry" in Fayette County-need
protection from haphazard and uncontrolled business and industrial
growth. The report as submitted did not give that protection.
On April 19, 1957 the Fayette County Fiscal Court passed the
following resolution:
Whereas, an emergency exists in regard to the unprecedented urban growth in Fayette County; and many large industries
selected locations in this area in 1956, and others may quickly follow,
And Whereas, the jurisdiction of zoning in counties containing second class cities is restricted by law and by court decisions
interpreting the law; and the last court decision regarding the jurisdiction of zoning in this county was based on old conditions,
And Whereas, the Lexington Fayette County Planning and
Zoning Commission has not recently defined the area of its jurisdiction,
And Whereas, there exists great danger of unhealthy and
unregulated growth in this county which could be a detriment to the
farmers, horsemen and urban residents of this county,
And Whereas, many agencies of government and others
are planning to introduce and promote legislation in January, 1958
providing for county wide zoning and this legislation is reasonably
sure of passage, and will provide for county wide zoning in all counties
containing cities of the second class,
And Whereas, our problems are similar to those in Jefferson County where by law county wide zoning exists,
And Whereas, the growth in this county is outside the
corporate limits of the city of Lexington; and the city is not as
directly concerned as the County Government,
Resolved, that for the reasons set forth above and under
the circumstances stated, it is hereby determined that the entire area
of Fayette County is the municipal area; and that pursuant to the
inherent powers of the county government to protect and preserve
the community from these expressed dangers, and to protect the
property of its citizens and the unusual use of its agricultural area;
and further to promote the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, it
is declared that the planning and zoning jurisdiction and the rules
and regulations of the City County Planning & Zoning Commission
shall henceforth include all of Fayette County, Kentucky, and the
Planning & Zoning Commission as an agency of the Fiscal Court is
directed to give effect to this Resolution.

On Monday, April 22, 1957, the City-County Planning and Zoning
Commission approved the resolution of the Fiscal Court. This resolution reassumes jurisdiction over the entire county and attempts to
nullify the Court of Appeals' decision in the American Sign Corporation case on the grounds of "emergency". If the legislature in 1958 does
pass a statute giving second class cities jurisdiction over the county,
the resolution may be effective as an "interim ordinance". If the legislature does not pass such a statute, however, grave problems as to the
effectiveness of this resolution will arise, unless in a subsequent case
the Court of Appeals overrules American Sign Corporation.
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IV
CONSTrUIONALTrY OF EXTr TERrOBMAL ZONIG

The issue of constitutionality may be involved in the exercise of
extraterritorial power where the county is not represented at all in the
zoning scheme. There fs no doubt that zoning of unincorporated territory by the city of the first class and the county in which it is located
is constitutional because of equal representation on the city-county
zoning board. Likewise, zoning by second class cities and the county
in which it is situated is probably constitutional, because the citycounty planning commission is comprised of both city and county
representatives, and the county fiscal court has to approve the zoning
before it can be effective outside the city. This seems sufficient to
meet the property owners' objection that they are being governed without representation. It is believed, however, that cities of the third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth class do not have authority to zone extraterritorially and that, even if they do have such authority, extraterritorial
zoning by these cities is unconstitutional, because there is no provision for a joint city-county commission or for approval by the county
fiscal court.
The Kentucky Court has not ruled directly on this issue of constitutionality. However, the Court of Appeals in the case of Smeltzer
v. Messer, supra, indicated that there might be doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute which authorized cities of the third, fourth,
fifth and sixth classes to zone outside their corporate limits. The Court
pointed out, with regard to such cities, that the property owners in the
fringe areas had no voice in the legislative policies of the municipality
to which their property was being subjected. That case involved a
fourth class city which had enacted a zoning ordinance, under alleged
authority of the enabling statute, which extended to all land within
three and one-half miles of the city limits. The Court did not rule on
its constitutionality because that issue was not before the court. The
plaintiff's property was in another county and the court ruled only
that the Enabling Act did not empower a municipality to impose
zoning restrictions on land outside the city limits in another county.
Nor did the Court reach the issue of whether cities of the third, fourth,
fifth and sixth classes had been enabled to zone outside the city limits
in their own county. It pointed out, nevertheless, that under Kentucky
Revised Statutes, Sec. 100.500 there is a rather clear implication that
the power granted to third through sixth class cities is limited to the
territorial boundaries of the city. KRS Section 100.610 authorizes a
city in one of these classes to create, by ordinance, a city planning
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commission, and Section 100.650 provides that the commission shall
make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the
city and the municipal area. However, no provisions are made for
zoning the municipal area outside the corporate limits, and a distinction can be drawn between the authority of the commission to
plan beyond the city limits and the power to zone beyond the city
limits. In the case of Selignam v. Belknap,28 the Court made such a
distinction and under the Enabling Act then in effect, since amended,
denied Louisville the power to zone beyond its corporate limits.
Another indication that cities in this third grouping do not have
authority to zone extraterritorially is gleaned from a study of the Enabling Act. It is noted that both the city and county of a first class
city must both pass on the zoning ordinance before it is effective. And
with regard to second class cities, the county fiscal court must approve of the plan before it can affect land outside the corporate limits.
However, no such restriction is placed on cities in this third grouping.
There appear to be no reasons why the legislature would want to give
such cities greater power to zone extraterritorially than cities of the
first and second class. An inference can be drawn from this that the
legislature did not intend to give such cities the power to zone beyond
their corporate limits. But assuming the contrary, since no provision
is made for representation by the inhabitants of the unincorporated
territory on the planning commission, extraterritorial zoning by such
cities may well be-as pointed out above-unconstitutional.
V
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the Kentucky enabling statutes are not at all clear
as to what extraterritorial jurisdiction planning commissions of the
second through the sixth class cities have. Nor has the Court of Appeals
thrown much light on the matter. If Kentucky should do as a majority
of states have done and give the county express authority to zone its
unincorporated territory, many problems of extraterritorial zoning
would be solved. The county could work hand in hand with the city
to realize the objectives of a single comprehensive plan for the whole
city-county area. The objective of such a plan would be to promote
the welfare of the county residents as well as the city dwellers, two
groups whose well-being, inseparably interrelated, is still in Kentucky
legally separated.
BFAUcHA' E. BROGAN
2

8

Seligman v. Belknap, 288 Ky. 133, 155 SW 2d 735 (1941).

